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I. The Many Changing Faces of Taiwan
In recent years Taiwan's social, political, and economic developments and the
resulting changes in this island republic have attracted increasing global atten-
tion.' Since its recovery from fifty years of Japanese occupation in 1945, Taiwan
has been controlled by the Nationalist Republic of China (ROC). The 20 million
Taiwan Chinese now enjoy a per capita GNP of about U.S. $8,000, and their
government has accumulated about U.S. $70 billion of foreign exchange re-
serves. How best to tap this financial capital has become a new policy issue. This
article thus examines three milestones of financial reform in Taiwan: the foreign
exchange liberalization since mid-1987, the transformation of its securities mar-
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ket since early 1988, and its banking reform since mid-1989. This article also
attempts to develop strategies for foreign firms interested in this exciting market.
II. Liberalization of Taiwan's Foreign Exchange Control
A. PRE-1987 FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL
Taiwan's principal foreign exchange statute has been the Statute for the Ad-
ministration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 2 Foreign exchange authority lies pri-
marily with the Foreign Exchange Bureau of the Central Bank of China (CBC)
and secondarily with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), while the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (MOEA) regulates imports and exports.
Prior to 1987, SAFE required that foreign exchange earnings resulting from
exports of goods and services generally had to be sold to the CBC or to "appointed
banks"-banks authorized by the CBC to engage in foreign exchange business.
While this surrender system gave the CBC substantial discretion in channelling
economic activities, the basic premise of the SAFE-shortage of foreign
exchange-changed after the early 1970s, and the system became too rigid despite
such discretion. Indeed, foreign exchange control had to be relaxed because of
Taiwan's substantial trade surplus, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves,
and the expectation of the New Taiwan (N.T.) dollar's appreciation.
B. AMENDMENT TO THE SAFE
To liberalize foreign exchange control, the ROC's Legislative Yuan (the Par-
liament) passed a bill in June 1987, adding article 26-1 to the SAFE, which
authorizes the Executive Yuan (the Cabinet) to suspend the application of core
provisions of the SAFE in whole or in part when the ROC experiences a long-
term international trade surplus or accumulates substantial foreign exchange
reserves, or when the international economy experiences major changes. 3 In July
1987, the CBC suspended the SAFE's core provisions and implemented eight
regulations under article 26-1 to usher in a new era. Of these regulations, the
most important are the Regulations for Nongovernmental Inward Remittance
(Inward Regulations) and the Regulations for Nongovernmental Outward Remit-
tance (Outward Regulations).
Under the Inward Regulations, any adult individual holding a national iden-
tification card or an alien residency certificate now may accept remittances up to
2. That this statute should have an acronym like "SAFE" is only fitting as Taiwan's foreign
exchange policy has always been safety-oriented. For studies of the fiscal and monetary policies of
Taiwan, see Lundberg, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, in ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE IN TAIWAN, THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 263 (W. Galenson ed.
1979).
3. See Liu, Republic of China's Deregulation of Foreign Exchange Control, 6 CHINESE Y.B.
INT'L L. & AFF. 298 (1986-87).
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U.S. $2 million each year for conversion into N.T. dollars. Futhermore, inward
remittance for the repatriation of capital and profits from an offshore investment
or from a foreign investor's investment in Taiwan has to be approved by the
CBC.4 Under the Outward Regulations, Taiwan entities and adult individuals
holding a national identification card or an alien residency certificate may make
outward remittances in foreign exchange of up to U.S. $5 million per year,
except that each outward remittance exceeding U.S. $1 million is subject to a
ten-day waiting period. Remittances exceeding the U.S. $5 million or U.S. $1
million limit require a special approval by the CBC.5
C. IMPACT ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Foreign investment in Taiwan is administered under the Statute for Investment
by Foreign Nationals (SIFN) enacted in 1954. It is centered around the privilege
of an investor with foreign investment approval (FIA) status, granted by the
Investment Commission (IC) of the MOEA, to repatriate the original capital
(whether in the form of equity investment or loan investment), investment yield
(whether in the form of dividend or repayment of interest on loan investment),
and return on investment (capital gains). 6 However, the SIFN is not an all-
inclusive statute on foreign investment in Taiwan; foreign banks, insurance com-
panies, and other foreign companies can set up branches in Taiwan without
undergoing the FIA process.7 The SAFE liberalization led to an amendment of
the SIFN in 1989 and to relaxation of the administrative policy of the IC, which
had even begun to grant FIA status more liberally since the early 1980s. The
most recent example is evidenced by the IC's permitting FIA holding companies
to be foreign-owned after 1988 in order to allow foreign investors more leeway
in selecting proper opportunities in Taiwan. As amended, the SIFN now sets
forth a negative listing policy by listing industries and businesses in which
foreign investment is prohibited or restricted.8
The SIFN does provide for some advantages over, say, a non-FIA foreign-
owned company. An FIA company is exempt from some cumbersome company
law requirements on nationality and residence of the chairman and rules gov-
erning mandatory public offerings and employee stock subscription rights. An-
other reason for applying for the FIA status is that the Statute for Encouragement
of Investment (SEI) provides for a more favorable rate for the withholding tax on
dividends payable to FIA investors; the FIA withholding rate is 20 percent,
4. Regulations for Nongovernmental Inward Remittance art. 4. The quota has been increased
several times from the original amount of U.S. $50,000.
5. Regulations for Nongovernmental Outward Remittance art. 5.
6. Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals [SIFNI art. 7.
7. Review by other competent ROC authorities, however, is still required.
8. See Liu, Survey of Major Commercial Law Developments in the Republic of China: 1987-
88, 7 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L & AFF. 136, 152 (1987-88) for an analysis and translation of the negative
list.
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instead of the regular 35 percent. 9 But the gradual removal of foreign exchange
controls eventually could also obviate the need to seek the FIA status. In fact, as
the Outward Regulations grant a regulatory repatriation privilege, some foreign
investors have avoided the FIA application process with the IC by setting up, say,
a non-FIA branch in Taiwan.
D. IMPACT ON DIRECT OUTWARD INVESTMENT
The 1987 Outward Regulations have facilitated direct investment abroad to
secure raw materials, technology, and markets. The regulations should also en-
able the ROC to offset capital outflow against its trade surplus.' ° For years,
however, Taiwan companies have had to apply for an Outward Investment Ap-
proval (OIA) for investing directly abroad under the Regulations Governing the
Review of Outward Investment and Outward Technical Cooperation (OIA Reg-
ulations). These regulations regulate companies, but do not relate to individuals
investing abroad; before 1987 the policy was not to encourage individuals to
invest abroad. After July 1987, these regulations became a hurdle, instead of a
facilitating vehicle, to Taiwan companies wishing to invest. Individuals now
simply may follow the less taxing requirements of the Outward Regulations to
invest abroad, whereas Taiwan companies still have to undergo the OIA process.
To narrow this disparate treatment, an amendment adding a three-tier review
test in the OIA Regulations was adopted in March 1989. An outward investment
for less than U.S. $1 million may be implemented prior to its being reported to
the IC. To make an outward investment of between U.S. $1 million and U.S. $5
million, an OIA application has to be filed with the IC. After a thirty-day waiting
period expires without the disapproval of the IC, the project is deemed to have
been approved. An outward investment exceeding U.S. $5 million will receive
the full scrutiny of the IC. 11 As thus amended, the OIA Regulations now parallel
the monetary limits of the Outward Regulations.
E. IMPACT ON ACQUISITIONS BY TAIWAN COMPANIES
The SAFE liberalization and the amendment to the OIA Regulations are not
sufficient to foster an environment conducive to investment abroad; other
changes are necessary. For example, until recently, under the Company Law a
9. See, e.g. SIFN art. 18; Statute for Encouragement of Investments [SEI] art. 16.
10. Small wonder, then, that 1989 was a boom crop year for outward investment by Taiwan
companies, with a total approved amount of about U.S. $930 million, representing a 300 percent
increase in the total amount approved over the prior year and even surpassing the cumulative
approved amount since 1959 by more than 50 percent. See INVESTMENT COMMISSION REPORT ON
ANALYSIS OF OUTWARD INVESTMENT 5 (1989). Although lacking reliable statistics, individual invest-
ment abroad may be several times that of the corporate approved amount.
11. Regulations Governing the Review of Outward Investment and Outward Technical Cooper-
ation art. 3.
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Taiwan company's total investment in other companies in Taiwan and abroad
could not exceed 40 percent of its own paid-in capital.' 2 The tax law also
discriminates against companies investing abroad; return on investment abroad
that inures to a Taiwan individual investor does not constitute ROC-source in-
come and is not subject to ROC income tax, whereas Taiwan companies' world-
wide income is subject to corporate income tax.13
Such disadvantages do not inhibit outward investment; they only encumber the
process. Foreign exchange liberalization certainly has enhanced the possibility of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 14 For example, for the first time in Feb-
ruary 1990 a group of Taiwan investors, including a government-owned devel-
opment fund, acquired Wyse Technology, Inc., a public company in San Jose,
California, and a world leader in selling computer monitors. In December 1989,
Yuen Foong Yu Paper Manufacturing Company, a leading public company in
Taiwan, floated the first Eurobond ever by a Taiwan company for U.S. $100
million at a low coupon rate of two percent per annum. The bond is "convert-
ible" when and if foreign portfolio investment in Taiwan companies is permitted
by the ROC Government.
The July 1987 liberalization, however, has also complicated the framework
governing cross-border investment. There is now a dual regulatory scheme: the
SIFN and the OIA Regulations form an internally coherent set of rules regulating
foreign investment and investment abroad, but the CBC's Inward Regulations
and Outward Regulations superimpose another regulatory layer on exactly the
same regulatory framework.
F. IMPACT ON FOREIGNERS' PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
For foreign portfolio investors interested in Taiwan's securities market, not
much has changed since July 1987. In fact, measures were taken to enhance the
control on inward remittance to prevent the influx of hot monies. Now that
foreign exchange control is less useful in regulating investment, other measures
such as the Securities Exchange Law (SEL) have become the more convenient
regulatory substitutes. To this end, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) instructed the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Taiwan securities firms
not to permit foreigners' applications to open brokerage accounts except for
selling their holdings. Similarly, the MOF directed that ROC financial institu-
tions may not take N.T. dollar deposits from nonresident aliens or foreign cor-
porations. This containment policy has not worked very well, however. Hot
12. Company Law art. 13. A bill to relax this rule was enacted by the Legislative Yuan on
October 24, 1990.
13. Income Tax Law arts. 2, 3, 8.
14. The term "mergers and acquisitions" is used descriptively, as the ROC's Company Law
does not provide for mergers between foreign and Taiwan companies.
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monies are believed to have come freely into Taiwan's financial system none-
theless and have made waves in the securities market. 15
Pressures are mounting for foreign institutional investors' participation in
Taiwan's securities market. Two examples are noteworthy. First is the new
authorization under the 1988 SEL amendment to permit, under certain circum-
stances, foreign securities firms to establish joint-venture local subsidiaries (in
which they initially will have to take a minority position) or branches to engage
in underwriting, brokerage, and dealing business. The second is the recent at-
tempt by foreign insurance companies operating through Taiwan branches to
lobby for permission to invest their own funds and liability reserves in listed
Taiwan securities.' 6 American insurance companies with licensed branches in
Taiwan are now given national treatment to invest in listed securities in Taiwan
through their head offices. 17 Similarly, leading foreign securities houses are now
permitted to set up branches to engage in the brokerage business in Taiwan.
Following the lackluster performance of Taiwan's securities market in the first
half of 1990, there are renewed speculations that foreign institutional firms will
be permitted to invest in the securities market. 18
G. IMPACT ON OUTWARD PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Outward portfolio investment is now substantially liberalized because of the
U.S. $5 million annual quota for investment abroad provided for under the 1987
Outward Regulations. Since then, foreign financial firms have been frequenting
this newly discovered market or have been setting up operations in Taiwan to
promote portfolio investment abroad. Unfortunately, the definition of "foreign
exchange" in the SAFE still includes foreign securities. Failure of the SEL and
its enforcement rules to define the parameters of a private placement and some
ambiguous rulings and interpretive letters of the MOF and the SEC further
complicate this matter. In addition, the different regulatory standards for the
"foreign exchange investment trust" program regulated by the MOF and the
CBC, on the one hand, and the SEC programs on securities investment consult-
ing enterprises (SICE) to purchase foreign securities including mutual funds, on
the other hand, also add unnecessary confusion to this issue.19 Thus, for both
would-be investors and avid promoters, the state of regulating outbound portfolio
investment leaves much to be desired.
15. See Hsu & Liu, supra note 1, at 179-80.
16. See Liu, supra note 8, at 153.
17. For limitations, see Insurance Law art. 146. For a study on the trade pressure gradually
leading to this result, see Liu, supra note 1, at 344-45.
18. See Ting, Special Treatment for Foreign Institutional Investors in the Market, COM. TIMES,
July 22, 1990, at 1, quoting the Governor of the CBC as agreeing to grant these firms an exemption
from the inward and outward remittance restrictions.
19. See Hsu & Liu, supra note 1, at 187-88.
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III. Transformation of Taiwan's Securities Market
A. SECURITIES MARKET AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The second wave of financial reform in Taiwan has been the transformation of
its securities market since 1988. Under the Land to the Tillers program in the
1950s, the ROC Government secured land from landowners for distribution to
the tenant farmers; in return, the landowners received from the government its
holdings in four major companies and land bonds. 20 This exchange fostered an
amorphous and primitive over-the-counter (OTC) securities market all over the
island.
Following the recommendation by the Task Force to Study the Establishment
of a Securities Market, the SEC was established in 1960. The TSE was estab-
lished in November 1961, and in April 1968 the SEL was enacted. The frame-
work for securities regulation in Taiwan was thus formally established. 2 1 The
SEL provides a comprehensive regulatory framework patterned after the Amer-
ican securities laws with the exception of the SEL's adoption of a merit review
system.22 The TSE is the most active market while there is also a small OTC debt
market and an emerging OTC market for equities. About 190 companies' secu-
rities now are listed on the TSE.
Before the 1988 SEL amendment, securities firms were classified into under-
writers, brokers, and dealers. A securities firm engaging in any one of such
businesses could not expand its activities into other lines of securities business.
One exception was made for financial institutions, which could, for example,
engage in the underwriting business if they were a trust company or the trust or
savings department of a bank, and if they also chose to engage in either the dealer
business or the brokerage business. At the time, only twenty-two underwriters
(of which only five or six were active), ten dealers, and twenty-eight brokers
(fourteen of which were private companies and the other fourteen the trust or
savings departments of government-owned financial institutions) were licensed
by the SEC.23 These licenses had been "frozen" by the government for many
years. Indeed, until six years ago the securities business in Taiwan was not
profitable; with a small number of listed companies and inadequate depth in the
market, many securities houses folded. The SEC has regulated brokerage com-
20. See Amsden, Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Depen-
dency Theory, in TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT, A RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
142, 152 (R. Bates ed. 1988).
21. See SEC, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 3, 4 (1987).
22. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Law [SEL] arts. 20 (antifraud), 22 (registration requirement),
30 (statutory prospectus), 31 (prospectus delivery requirement), 32 (prospectus accuracy require-
ment), 155 (prohibition of wash sales and other market manipulations), 157 (short swing profit
disgorgement) & 157-1 (insider trading sanctions).
23. Such statistics were cumulative. Several different lines of the securities businesses could be
engaged in by the same entity. See SEC, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1987).
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missions and has set the rate at 0.1425 percent of the transfer price. 2 4 Commis-
sion rebates are nevertheless frequent, reflecting keen competition.
Internationalization of Taiwan's securities market began in the mid-1980s.
Prior to the 1988 SEL amendment, however, the government also did not con-
sider permitting foreign ownership in securities firms. 25
There is an oligopoly of four mutual fund management companies, all of
which are international joint ventures licensed by the SEC as securities invest-
ment trust enterprises (SITE). Total foreign ownership in each SITE company is
restricted to no more than 49 percent. 26 The entire mutual fund industry was
created as a result of the policy of the Executive Yuan of the ROC, adopted in
1982, to permit the three-stage internationalization of Taiwan's securities mar-
ket. 27 The four management companies are authorized to establish mutual funds
based upon securities investment trust contracts among them, the custodian
banks, and the beneficial owners of units in the funds.
That this arrangement has been accomplished under a framework covered only
by a single statutory provision, article 18-1 of the SEL, is amazing. As a civil
law country, Taiwan does not have a comprehensive trust law, and the SEC
drafted the detailed regulations from scratch. Each SITE company now sponsors
a "foreign fund" traded abroad, as well as other funds. Despite the participation
of new institutional investors such as the funds, the TSE is still overwhelmingly
dominated by individual investors, whose herd mentality partially explains the
volatility of the market. Until September 1990, pension funds could not invest in
the Taiwan securities market because of the Basic Labor Standards Law and
because of conservative government policies on the safety of such funds.
There are about three dozen SEC-licensed SICE companies. The ROC Gov-
ernment has always permitted complete foreign ownership in such SICE com-
panies. However, this business was unprofitable until the SEC promulgated the
Guidelines Governing the Operations of Securities Investment Consulting En-
terprises in Providing Foreign Securities-Related Advice (Foreign Securities Ad-
vice Regulations) in late 1987 to permit SICE companies to advise on foreign
24. For a comparison of the securities transaction tax in other countries and a critique on the
United States' proposal on such a tax, see Grundfest, Transaction Tax Asks for Trouble, Asian Wall
St. J., July 24, 1990, at 8.
25. The only "exception" at that time was Citibank, which had a 40 percent holding in Taiwan
First Investment Trust Co., Ltd., a local trust company authorized to engage in securities business
under art. 101 of the Banking Law and art. 45 of the SEL.
26. Rules for the Administration of Securities Investment Trust Enterprises art. 4.
27. The first step, which entailed permitting foreign investors to invest indirectly in Taiwan's
securities market through such "foreign funds," has been accomplished. The second stage contem-
plated a plan giving access to foreign institutional investors to invest directly in Taiwan's securities
market. The ROC Government had begun to draft the regulations in 1986 for the second-stage
liberalization, but put a halt to it because of concerns with the foreign exchange effect of the second
stage. The foreign exchange reserves of the ROC were already at a staggering amount at that time.
The third stage, which is yet to be accomplished, envisions complete access to any foreign investor
to invest directly in Taiwan's securities market.
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securities, particularly foreign mutual funds. 28 In fact, such permission amounts
to permitting such SICE companies to promote and distribute foreign securities.
The SICE, however, still may not handle discretionary investments for their
clients. Hence, there is now a strong lobby by the association of SICE companies
for this authorization.
B. GROWTH OF TAIWAN'S SECURITIES MARKET
The TSE has undergone a major transformation in recent years. Trading has
multiplied at least fifty times since 1972, and on a high day the trading volume
now can surpass U.S. $7.5 billion, roughly one-tenth of Taiwan's total foreign
exchange reserves. It is widely suspected that much of this active trading is
fueled by "hot monies" from abroad and the activities of underground "invest-
ment companies." This increase in activity of the TSE has brought about changes
in work ethics and the value system.2 9 With entrenched positions in the market
until mid-1988, brokers earned oligopolistic profits, to the order of several times
their paid-in capital during 1986-1987.
Before 1985, few would have surmised that the TSE weighted stock index
could ever exceed 1,000 points. But it went up to 4,673 points shortly before the
October 1987 global crash and rebounded to 8,000 points by September 1988.
The market, however, lost about 3,000 points in a month's time after an MOF
capital gains tax announcement. Then, again the market rallied, and by early
1990 the TSE index exceeded 12,000 points. Adverse economic performance in
1990 and uncertainties in the development of several political reform measures
once more brought it down to 3,500 points. Since 1972 the number of share-
holders of record in TSE-listed companies has increased by five times. The
number of brokerage accounts is already approaching five million as of May
1990, an exponential growth.3 °
C. TRANSFORMATION OF TAIWAN'S SECURITIES MARKET
The 1988 SEL amendment and ensuing regulatory changes have transformed
Taiwan's securities market. 3' To foreign observers the most important revision in
the amendment clearly has been the liberalization of the securities industry. The
28. There are requirements on the rating, listing, size, and track record of the fund or fund
management companies. Guidelines Governing the Operations of Securities Investment Consulting
Enterprises in Providing Foreign Securities-Related Advice arts. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7.
29. Also, one recent governmental study suggested that gaps in income distribution in Taiwan for
1988 continued to widen after seven consecutive years of increasing discrepancies. As of the end of
1988 the top 20 percent of earners in Taiwan as a group earned 4.85 times the income of the lowest
earners as a group. See Econ. Daily News, Aug. 31, 1989, at 2.
30. Many investors maintain multiple brokerage accounts. One estimate suggests that there are
actually only about 1.2 million investors, still a significant percentage. Lin, Myths about Taiwan's
Money Game, China Times, July 30, 1990, at 4.
31. See Hsu & Liu, supra note 1, at 169.
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amendment has permitted foreign securities firms to have limited access to Tai-
wan's securities market and has created integrated securities houses (ISH). These
are securities firms that can hold underwriter, broker, and dealer licenses simul-
taneously.
Following the 1988 SEL amendment, the Criteria for the Establishment of
Securities Firms (Establishment Criteria) were adopted quickly, and the SEC
began accepting applications. The result is a Taiwan version of the "Big Bang":
the number of brokerage firms in Taiwan has increased to over 300 now, with
about forty ISH operations. The securities market cannot sustain so many inter-
mediaries; a shake-out will occur when the market undergoes a downturn. The
minimum paid-in capital for the underwriting, dealing, and brokerage operations
is N.T. $400 million, N.T. $400 million, and N.T. $200 million, respectively.
Therefore, an ISH operation will require a total paid-in capital of N.T. $1 billion.
Prior SEC approval is required for setting up such securities firms.
32
Foreign access to this new market was provided for in three alternative ways.
First, any foreign investor may invest in a securities operation by joint-venturing
with Taiwan investors. Second, foreign securities firms may set up a branch
operation. Third, foreign banks' branches in Taiwan may set up a securities
operation, now a closer reality because of the 1989 Banking Law Amendment.
As of this writing, however, no such foreign bank branch has been licensed. The
SEC has discretion to limit the number and the business scope of foreign secu-
rities firms setting up a branch operation or foreign banks' Taiwan branches
setting up a securities operation. Foreign securities firms must meet certain
requirements in order to set up a branch in Taiwan and, once set up, they will be
subject to the same requirements as Taiwan securities firms, except that they have
to choose to engage in only certain securities operations.
Foreign nationals may invest in a securities company to engage in securities
operations, but prior approval of the SEC is required. Such investment also has
to undergo the FIA review process pursuant to the SIFN. The total amount of
foreign ownership in a securities business entity, however, may not exceed 40
percent of its paid-in capital, and each foreign investor may invest in not more
than 10 percent of the total paid-in capital of the entity. 33 Moreover, once a
foreign investor invests in a securities entity, it may not invest in any other
securities entity.
In June 1989, the SEC issued Regulations for Foreign Securities Firms Es-
tablishing Brokerage Branches (Brokerage Branch Regulations) to permit foreign
securities firms to set up a Taiwan brokerage branch. The home country of these
foreign securities firms must grant reciprocity in order for them to set up this
branch. However, initially only three foreign securities firms would be permitted
32. Criteria for the Establishment of Securities Finns arts. 3, 7.
33. Id. arts. 36, 37.
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to set up the branch, and the number of these brokerage branches may increase
over time, subject to the conditions of Taiwan's economy and its financial and
securities markets. The paid-in capital of such foreign securities firms must
exceed U.S. $2 billion, and their total asset value must exceed U.S. $20 billion.
The foreign securities firm or one of its subsidiaries must be a member of the
New York Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the London Stock
Exchange. In addition, it must have the necessary information transmission
facilities linked up with these three stock exchanges.34 Thus far, only Merrill
Lynch and Shearson Lehman Hutton, both of which have since suffered adverse
operating results in their home country, have indicated their interest in such a
branch.
D. "NEw" INSTRUMENTS AND MARKET STABILITY
To enhance market stability and growth, Taiwan's SEC has to be receptive to
developing "new" securities and other instruments. A case in point is the con-
vertible bond, a new arrival in Taiwan's market. The SEC drafted a set of
regulations as early as March 1983. No convertible bond could be issued at the
time, however, because of some practical difficulties arising from the Company
Law rigidity and share listing. 35 Then, in 1988, Yuen Foong Yu Paper Manu-
facturing Company, Ltd., issued a modified form of the convertible bond, Yuen
Foong Yu Series No. 1 (Exchangeable) Bond, for N.T. $1 billion at 3.01 percent
per annum. Being the first "convertible" bond issued in Taiwan, it was quite
unusual in that it was convertible into the shares of a company in which Yuen
Foong Yu has a significant holding. Subsequent developments are also encour-
aging: Yuen Foong Yu and other companies have successfully floated convertible
preferred shares to the public in Taiwan.
In August 1989, the SEC amended its 1983 convertible bond regulations to
deal with the issues that had prevented such bonds from being issued. Again,
Yueng Foong Yu issued another "convertible" bond at 2 percent coupon rate in
late 1989 in the Eurobond market to finance the acquisition of offshore paper
manufacturing facilities. Other public companies in Taiwan attempted to follow
suit, but failed to launch such offerings in time for the bullish Eurobond and
Taiwan markets in 1989. The Yuen Foong Yu pattern merits continued exami-
nation because an offshore convertible bond could finance Taiwan companies'
mergers and acquisitions abroad at a much lower funding cost. And, importantly,
it will increase the globalization of the TSE as foreign portfolio investors convert
to become shareholders of TSE-listed companies.
34. Regulations for Foreign Securities Firms Establishing Brokerage Branches art. 3.
35. The main issue is the Company Law's requirement of registering paid-in capital, which is
difficult to administer when there are continuing conversions.
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Another governmental measure to increase the size of the TSE is to privatize
and then to list state-owned enterprises. 36 Already a successful pattern has
emerged. The first privatization program (also the largest underwriting in the
TSE's history) was the secondary offering by Chinese Petroleum Corporation, a
government-owned enterprise, of some of its holdings in China Steel Corpora-
tion, the government-owned steel corporation, in early 1989. A basic statute
governing the privatization of government-owned enterprises will be amended to
give the Executive Yuan freer hands in the privatization program. Close to
twenty government-owned companies, with businesses ranging from petroleum,
steel, electrical power, and utilities to banking and chemicals, have been iden-
tified for gradual privatization. But Taiwan's privatization program calls for, at
least in the beginning, the government holdings to be maintained at a majority
level to ensure control.
Other proposals also could increase the size of the securities market. The SEC
has demonstrated a keen interest in allowing warrants and options to be issued,
which would require another amendment to the SEL.37 Following the market
downturn since early 1990, domestic pension funds now are permitted to invest
in the securities market to increase its stability.
E. NEW WAVE OF CROss-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Some form of internationalization of the TSE is already happening as a result
of a new wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions of listed companies. A
recent example is the acquisition of 25 percent of the shares of the Yue Loong
Motors Company, Ltd., a TSE-listed automobile manufacturer, by Nissan Mo-
tors of Japan in 1985. Such acquisitions generally involve some form of man-
agement participation in order to receive the FIA. Therefore, they are almost
always friendly takeovers or alliances. Since the Wyse Technology takeover by
a Taiwan consortium, internationalization of Taiwan's securities market has also
taken on a new meaning because of the long-term impact of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions by Taiwan companies. Such acquisitions, which tend to be
friendly transactions as well, certainly will make Taiwan companies more inter-
nationalized.
Mergers and acquisitions abroad would make sense for Taiwan companies for
several reasons. First, the country and its people are now rich enough to invest
abroad. Second, many Taiwan companies are diversifying or positioning them-
selves as the economy in Taiwan is being transformed. Third, the appreciation of
the N.T. dollar has made foreign goods (including foreign companies) less ex-
36. Privatization has been suggested by the private sector in Taiwan for a long time. See, e.g.,
Introspections on Breaking 5,000 Points: Privatizing Government-Owned Enterprises to Stabilize the
Securities Market, Econ. Daily News, June 10, 1988, at 2.
37. Currently there are only statutory subscription rights of employees and the public. See
Company Law art. 267; SEL art. 28-1.
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pensive. Fourth, mindful of dealing with trade protectionism, and in need of
natural resources and new technologies, Taiwan companies have found that
mergers and acquisitions abroad offer the expediency of leap-frogging if synergy
exists. Fifth, in countries like the United States industry is going through a trend
of divestment so that one-time conglomerates can concentrate on their main-line
businesses. This breakup creates buying opportunities. For listed companies in
Taiwan, or those that will become so in the short-term, this phenomenon even
offers a key financial strategy: price earnings arbitrage.
38
The price earnings arbitrage assumes that the price earnings ratios of TSE-
listed companies will be much higher than other listed companies in the world.
On this assumption, public investors in Taiwan are willing to pay a premium for
assets abroad, including foreign companies, which do not earn as much. There-
fore, it would be financially sensible for Taiwan companies to take over foreign
companies and, after having their value consolidated into their own, go public on
the TSE. To introduce another financial consideration into this strategy, Taiwan
companies could issue convertible bonds to finance more cheaply such mergers
and acquisitions abroad. By the end of this century, one could expect to see more
Taiwan-based multinational corporations whose growth presumably would be
bankrolled by the less expensive equity capital in Taiwan.
IV. Banking Law Reform
A. BANKING INDUSTRY
The third wave of Taiwan's recent financial reform has been the banking sector
reform since 1989. Again, the reasons and momentum for reform can be traced
to a much earlier period. From the 1945 restoration of Taiwan to the loss of
mainland China in 1949, banks in Taiwan were gradually transformed from the
previous Japanese management. Most of them became state-owned banks and
began to play a major role, because almost all banks originally operating in
mainland China ceased operation. Not even the CBC was in operation when the
ROC Government relocated to Taiwan. The 1933 Banking Law enacted in main-
land China became out-of-date as the banking industry began to settle in Taiwan,
and new banking legislation was finally enacted in 1975. Foreign banks were also
permitted to set up branches in Taiwan, with Daichi Kangyo Bank taking the lead
to set up a branch office in 1959, thus beginning the modest internationalization
of Taiwan's banking industry.
There is a partial and one-sided regulatory dichotomy of commercial and
investment banking in Taiwan. Some banking institutions may engage in certain
kinds of securities business through their savings and trust departments; securi-
38. For a description of the price earning ratios of TSE companies, see Hsu & Liu, supra note
1, at 180.
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ties firms, however, may not engage in any banking business. 39 For many years
state-owned banks and financial institutions dominated the banking industry.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s foreign banks were increasingly attracted to this
market by Taiwan's economic development.
There are now twenty-four domestic banks in Taiwan, most of which are
commercial banks. Thirty-four foreign banks maintain Taiwan branches, and
more than a dozen foreign banks maintain representative offices. There are also
eight trust and investment companies, some of which have foreign minority
shareholders. But the Banking Law is not all-inclusive in regulating financial
institutions. Outside the regulatory framework of the Banking Law are other
banking institutions, such as credit cooperatives and credit departments of farm-
ers' and fishermen's associations. In addition, a well-entrenched postal savings
system, influenced by the Japanese system, also receives deposits through widely
dispersed post offices.
B. BANKING LAW AMENDMENT
The 1989 Banking Law Amendment revised more than one-fourth of its pro-
visions. The amendment's professed goals were to (1) permit privately held
banks to be set up for the first time, (2) strengthen the banking system, (3)
expedite liberalization of the banking sector, and (4) maintain disciplined, or-
derly, and responsible activities in the banking system. The MOF also obtained
substantial discretion in implementing the amendment by detailed regulations, as
in the case of liberalizing the capital and foreign exchange markets. Since the Big
Bang of 1988 for the securities market, about 300 new securities firms have
sprung up. But one should not antiipate a significant number of new commercial
banks being set up after the 1989 Banking Law Amendment. Indeed, all indica-
tions thus far suggest that opening up the banking sector to private investment
will take a much longer time to launch and that liberalization will be carefully
planned and implemented. Nineteen groups applied to set up new commercial
banks in October 1990, but there may be ten newly set-up private banks at the
most, and even they probably will not be profitable in the beginning.
One of the keen governmental concerns in adopting banking sector reform is
to ensure that new banks will not be controlled by wealthy groups of individuals
and their affiliates.40 Under the new Banking Law and Regulations Governing
the Establishment of Commercial Banks (Commercial Banks Regulations), un-
less approved by the MOF, no person may own more than five percent of the total
issued capital of a commercial bank. In addition, the total holdings of affiliated
persons may not exceed fifteen percent of the total issued capital of such a bank.
39. See Banking Law arts. 78, 101; SEL art. 45.
40. For Taiwan's recent concerns with the concentration of economic power, see Liu, Experi-
menting with Competition Law: A Preliminary Analysis of the Draft Fair Trade Law of Taiwan, the
Republic of China, 13 WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (1989).
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In addition to this requirement, the MOF's Commercial Banks Regulations also
require 20 percent of new commercial banks' initial paid-in capital to be sub-
scribed through public offerings. New commercial banks must have a minimum
paid-in capital of N.T. $10 billion (approximately U.S. $370 million). 41 This
amount is substantially higher than even the banking industry average in the
United States, Japan, and European countries, which are perceived to have a
more sound and modernized banking system. Therefore, the banking sector
liberalization is a stark contrast to the securities market liberalization.
C. REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS
Negative listing under the SIFN classifies foreign investment in banking in-
stitutions as a restricted activity. The Banking Law is silent as to foreign own-
ership of banking institutions in Taiwan; in the short-term future the likelihood
of foreign-owned Taiwan banks is low. Rather, the Banking Law primarily con-
templates foreign banks operating through Taiwan branches. It also authorizes
the MOF to specify the branch locations of foreign banks based upon the need for
international trade and industrial development.42 Foreign banks must allocate a
separate operating capital in Taiwan.43
Pursuant to the amended Banking Law, foreign banks' banking powers now
are selected from the powers of not only commercial banks, but also savings
banks or departments and trust banks or departments." This expansion of the
banking powers of Taiwan branches of foreign banks is the result of many years
of lobbying efforts, particularly by American banking institutions operating in
Taiwan, for national treatment. Such change has necessitated an amendment to
the Guidelines for Screening and Approval of Establishment of Branches and
Representative Offices by Foreign Banks (Foreign Banks Regulations).
The Foreign Banks Regulations have improved the national treatment of for-
eign banks, but complete open market access for foreign banks to participate
in Taiwan's financial market is not likely in the foreseeable future. 45 The Foreign
Banks Regulations clearly indicate that the MOF generally only invites the best
and largest foreign banks to set up operations in Taiwan, knowing that allowing
some level of foreign competition is the necessary trade-off for further interna-
tionalization of its financial sector. This limitation is to assist the MOF and the
CBC in regulating foreign banks in Taiwan. Since they are the largest (and thus
41. See Banking Law art. 25; Regulations Governing the Establishment of Commercial Banks
art. 3.
42. Banking Law art. 118.
43. Id. arts. 120, 121.
44. Id. art. 121.
45. There are, e.g., requirements on past business dealings with Taiwan banks and companies in
order for foreign banks to be approved to set up branches or representative offices in Taiwan. There
are also requirements such as those governing locations, banking powers, and deposit-to-capital
ratios that are applicable to foreign banks' Taiwan branches. See also Liu, supra note 1, at 338-40.
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presumed the best) foreign banks and are publicly traded in their home countries,
they have an incentive to maintain their own reputation. Extensive regulation by
the banking authorities in the foreign banks' home countries also alleviates the
burden on ROC banking regulators.
V. Taiwan's Financial Developments for the New Decade
A. REMOVAL OF CAPITAL GAINS TAX
The rapidly transforming political, economic, and social environment in Tai-
wan requires that various laws and regulations be revamped. Tax measures are
one of them. In 1988 highly volatile and speculative trading on the TSE fueled
a well-politicized capital gains tax revolt. As a result, the government made a
major compromise. The Income Tax Law was amended in late 1989 to eliminate
entirely the income tax on gains from securities trading.4 6 Instead, a higher rate
was set, at 0.6 percent, for the securities transactions tax. Both measures became
effective in 1990.
The removal of the securities-related capital gains tax will have a major impact
for both domestic and foreign investors. If securities-related capital gains had
been realized in 1989, Taiwan individuals and corporations would have been
subject to an income tax on 50 percent or 25 percent, respectively, of the gains.
A foreign investor's 1989 tax rate for capital gains was 25 percent as well. The
new 0.6 percent securities transactions tax, as the only tax cost, compares fa-
vorably with the previous tax regime, so long as a transfer of securities realizes
sufficient capital gains. In light of the high price-earning ratios of public com-
panies and of those companies having the potential to go public in Taiwan, the
shares of these companies often change hands at several times the cost basis of
the original shareholders. 47 The removal of the capital gains income tax, there-
fore, could fuel more mergers and acquisitions in Taiwan, as the tax cost is now
reduced to 0.6 percent of the gross selling price. The removal will also facilitate
corporate reorganizations such as spin-offs by eliminating otherwise prohibitive
tax costs. Taiwan's income tax legislation does not allow tax-free reorganizations
except in the case of statutory mergers.
The new tax regime also takes on another significance: it applies to the transfer
of both listed and unlisted securities. For most of the 1980s the capital gains
income tax was suspended, but only with respect to listed shares. Therefore, the
new tax regime since 1990 provides for adequate room in planning for tax-
advantaged investment projects, particularly where they involve the transfer of
unlisted shares of Taiwan companies before going public.
46. See Income Tax Law art. 4-1.
47. On the SEC's previous practice of regulating the underwriting price, thereby causing higher
traded prices after the shares are listed, see Hsu & Liu, supra note 1, at 187.
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B. NEW INVESTMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAM AND TAX REFORM
For many years Taiwan has used various tax and other incentives to encourage
investment and foster economic growth. Enacted in the 1960s, the SEI has been
the major embodiment of this incentive program. These incentives mainly take
the form of an income tax holiday or an accelerated depreciation of machinery and
equipment. They also include other measures such as investment tax credits,
reduced customs duties or exemption of duties on the importation of machinery
and equipment, reduced dividend withholding rate for approved FIA investors,
and assistance in the acquisition of industrial land. Of late, the SEI has been
criticized for distorting efficient allocation of resources and for creating an im-
balance in sectoral growth in the economy. The SEI itself provides for its expi-
ration by the end of 1990, which will have a major impact on investment decisions
in Taiwan. The ROC Government has sponsored a bill to enact a replacement
statute, the Statute for Upgrading Industries (SUI).
4 8
The SUI's professed cornerstone is neutrality of various measures to encour-
age investment, so as to avoid the misallocation of resources. To be sure, there
will be fewer tax incentives. In addition, the focus of the legislation will shift
from encouraging sectoral investments selectively to encouraging investment
activities by their functions and their impact on the economy. The traditional
preoccupation with the manufacturing sector will be rectified; instead, activities
such as the purchase of machinery and equipment, marketing efforts to develop
brand name recognition, and research and development programs will often be
the test for providing investment incentives. Instead of providing for income tax
holidays, the SUI is expected to rely more on investment tax credits. 49 To
upgrade industries by fostering more capital-intensive investments, the proposed
SUI bill also contains measures to liberalize restrictions on the amount of accu-
mulated earnings companies may retain without such accumulated retained earn-
ings being held to constitute deemed dividends to shareholders. The present
incentive of the reduced dividend tax rate for FIA investors under the SEI is
expected to remain as well.
Following the SAFE liberalization in 1987, the MOF impaneled a Tax Reform
Commission to study various tax measures. It is expected that these tax reform
measures will be guided by the same principles that have shaped the SUI bill.
Thus far, the MOF has yet to act on these measures by adopting concrete bills to
amend various existing tax measures. The long-term development of this tax
reform, however, should be of interest to foreign investors examining investment
opportunities in Taiwan. One possible recommendation of the tax measure may
be the elimination of double income taxation on the same underlying corporate
48. As of the writing of this article, the SUI was being debated in the Legislative Yuan.
49. See Statute for Upgrading Industries [SUI] art. 7.
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profits. There could be two alternatives. The first would grant a deduction to the
distributing company, thereby treating dividends essentially as interest payments.
The second alternative would call for granting a tax credit to the receiving
shareholders. Both approaches are designed to streamline the taxation of corpo-
rate income streams and reduce the overall tax burden of corporations. Another
tax measure may be not to recognize income when stock dividends are distrib-
uted. 50 Previously, the SEI provided for a tax deferment treatment for the dis-
tribution of stock dividends, but this exemption applied only to manufacturing
companies declaring stock dividends in connection with a capital expansion,
51pollution control, or credit enhancement program.
VI. Foreign Investors' Strategies for the Taiwan Market
A. LEVERAGE BY ON-SHORE PRESENCE
The discussions above should produce the following strategies for foreign
companies interested in doing business in or with their counterparts in Taiwan.
Foreign firms may wish to take advantage of the excess liquidity in Taiwan by,
for example, attracting Taiwan individuals and enterprises to invest abroad. This
is the business goal of many foreign firms. Experience has shown that these firms
will be more successful if they set up some form of on-shore presence in Taiwan.
On-shore presence suggests long-term commitment as well, a virtue for con-
ducting business in a Chinese environment. This strategy also takes advantage of
the liberalized investment environment of Taiwan in recent years. Even when the
business goal of foreign firms is not to attract investment from Taiwan, but to
trade with Taiwan, this strategy also applies. As indicated above, now there is no
restriction on setting up wholly owned trading companies or branches with
statutory or regulatory repatriation rights.
For those foreign investors interested in eventually providing liquidity and
creating a public market for interest in their Taiwan operations, the on-shore
presence is crucial. As discussed above, this strategy would entail having a
company incorporated under the laws of the ROC and having the center of
business activities for that company in Taiwan. These requirements are precon-
ditions to taking such a company public in Taiwan.
52
B. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SUI INCENTIVES
Foreign firms interested in engaging in manufacturing activities in Taiwan
recently placed timing considerations above all other considerations because of
the SEI expiration at the end of 1990. However, those who apply to set up
investment operations after 1991 need not feel that they have necessarily missed
50. See Income Tax Law art. 76-1.
51. See SEI art. 13.
52. See SEL arts. 4, 22.
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the boat. The SUI's investment tax credit could be a potentially useful incentive.
Although a trend toward granting fewer incentives is clearly the long-term policy
of the government in Taiwan, the incentives will not be withdrawn completely.
Therefore, foreign investors keen on obtaining the marginal utility of their in-
vestment funds should take full advantage of the tax and other incentives avail-
able under the SU.
C. INVEST IN THE SCIENCE PARK
Under the Statute for the Establishment of Science-Based Industrial Parks, a
science park has been set up in Hsin Chu. The goal of the Hsin Chu Science Park
is to create a mini-Silicon Valley in Taiwan to foster high-tech investment.
Therefore, this statute also provides for a variety of investment incentives, in-
cluding the five-year income tax holiday on initial establishment and the four-
year income tax holiday on project expansions. 5 Importantly, however, unlike
the SEI, which expired at the end of 1990, the science park statute does not have
an expiration date. Indeed, a policy is being formulated to expand the science
park concept and location islandwide. Therefore, foreign firms engaging in high-
tech activities should consider the alternative of investing in the science park.
Timing should be an important consideration as the Hsin Chu Science Park already
has shown some signs of saturation and difficulties in housing all investment projects.
However, as scientific and technological research continues to be an important gov-
ernmental policy, it is believed that the government will acquire additional space
around the science park. Therefore, its long-term prospect as an ideal research, de-
velopment, and manufacturing environment is still promising.
D. TAP THE SERVICE AND RETAIL MARKETS IN TAIWAN
The service sector of Taiwan's economy has been identified as the sector that
will enjoy higher growth in the future. In 1988 and 1989 this sector represented
the highest growth in Taiwan's domestic economy. Foreign firms should do well
to penetrate this potentially lucrative market. As discussed above, the overall
regulatory environment has been substantially liberalized. However, these firms
should take heed of the negative listing policy discussed above and then structure
their investment projects accordingly.
The same consideration applies to Taiwan's emerging retail and leisure-related
market.5 4 Taiwan consumers' purchasing power has increased along with the
accumulation of wealth. However, their willingness to spend and enjoy a higher
living standard is not matched by the availability of inexpensive goods and
53. See Statute for the Establishment and Administration of the Science-Based Industrial Parks
arts. 15-19.
54. To be sure, much of this has to do with Taiwan's massive import liberalization in recent
years. See B. BALASSA & J. WILLIAMSON, supra note I, at 83.
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services, hence, the business opportunities for tackling this market. In any event,
some Japanese, European, and American firms' success in this market (in such
segments as department stores, supermarket and convenience stores, fast food
restaurants, trading companies, and other retail outlets) already strongly suggests
that there is no reason why other foreign firms cannot achieve the same result in
this segment of the economy.
E. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FIA HOLDING COMPANY STRUCTURE
As discussed above, foreign firms now may set up FIA holding companies in
Taiwan with repatriation rights. Although the foreign investor does not yet have any
clear idea of what sector of Taiwan's economy in which to invest, the FIA holding
company enables him to deposit such funds pending investment in N.T. dollars in
Taiwan. This structure thus offers the flexibility of a vehicle for holding investments
in various sectors in Taiwan's economy within the limits of the negative listing. Where
the foreign investor has a commitment toward Taiwan, but wishes to reduce the
foreign exchange risk resulting from the N.T. dollar's further appreciation, the FIA
holding structure also provides for this exchange risk protection.55
An FIA holding company can invest in public companies in Taiwan, but it also may
set up or invest in private companies that have a good potential of going public in
Taiwan. Although double income taxation is a potential disadvantage, under the SUI,
as shareholders in operating companies, such FIA holding companies can accumulate
or capitalize retained earnings without triggering any income tax. When the oppor-
tunity is ripe for an acquisition or initial public offering, then offering investors may
exit through realizing capital gains at a low overall tax cost.
F. PARTICIPATE IN MEZZANINE FINANCING OPPORTUNITIES
Many Taiwan companies are seeking to internationalize, yet they do not enjoy
recognition in the international business community. Participation in the man-
agement of such Taiwan companies through the acquisition of some (often mi-
nority) equity interest is a viable strategy for foreign companies seeking to enter
the Taiwan market. Such Taiwan companies often seek mezzanine financing to
widen their shareholder base and to secure international recognition by obtaining
the investment and support from world class companies or investor groups. At
one time this strategy had become too costly because of the runaway price
earning ratios during late 1989 and early 1990. Since then the market corrected
itself, making the entry price for foreign investors in a round of mezzanine
financing more affordable.5 6
55. The initial capital of a Taiwan company has to be paid in before the promoters' meeting can
be held. Company Law art. 143.
56. This strategy could be perceived as a variation of the venture capital investment. See Liu,
Case Study: Venture Capital Investment Enterprises in Taipei, China, in AsIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 227 (1988).
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Again, a good exit for such mezzanine financing participation is often the
initial public offering of the investee companies. As discussed above, the more
favorable tax regime since 1990, following the removal of the securities-related
capital gains income tax, will also foster an environment conducive to such
investment strategies.
G. SEEK JOINT VENTURE OPPORTUNITIES AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Foreign firms should consider joint venture opportunities when contemplating
investment projects in Taiwan. A multitude of reasons supports this strategy. First,
there is a changing of the guard in Taiwan's leading corporate families. First-
generation entrepreneurs are transferring control to second-generation, Western-
trained family members, who are more receptive to joint ventures. Second, busi-
nesses targeting Taiwan's domestic market have become more profitable; for one
thing, the currency appreciation and increased per capita GNP have made the
domestic market more important. In penetrating the domestic market local part-
ners can help a great deal. Third, Taiwan companies have gained much sophis-
tication in production and management. They can truly contribute in a joint ven-
ture project. More importantly, international joint ventures are a good way for
Taiwan companies to internationalize; strategically, sooner or later Taiwan com-
panies need to increase their international activities outside Taiwan. They will
become a new breed of multinational corporations. Such international joint ven-
tures could pave the way for further global strategic alliances.57
To be sure, such international joint ventures could take a variety of forms and
select a number of sites. However, Taiwan partners in an international joint
venture are always mindful of the possibility of the joint venture company going
public in Taiwan, and rightly so. In recent years more international strategic
alliances have been formulated on such a model. Many Taiwan companies have
successfully acquired partial interest in existing foreign companies or have es-
tablished new joint ventures to gain access to marketing and distribution chan-
nels, raw materials, and technologies.
VII. Conclusion
Financial reforms pose challenges and opportunities. Financial regulators and
intermediaries in Taiwan alike will have to deal with the aftermaths of its three
waves of financial reforms. Further development of Taiwan's economy has much
to do with the success of such reforms, and there are reasons to be optimistic
about such success because liberalization has increased the flexibility in arrang-
ing transactions and implementing investment strategies.
57. Except for more sensitive economic segments in the negative list such as securities, Taiwan
does not require foreign investors to joint venture with local investors. Compare Salacuse, Host
Country Regulation of Joint Ventures and Foreign Investment, in JOINT VENTURING ABROAD: A CASE
STUDY 103 (D. Goldsweig ed. 1985).
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Taiwan is in a deregulatory trend. Well-to-do middle class, western-trained
technocrats and business leaders are more practical than their counterparts of the
prior generation. More importantly, the government is beginning to realize and
accept the change of its role from primarily a leader and active participant in the
economy to a regulator whose task is to adopt fair and clear rules to be faithfully
enforced in order to maintain an efficient, competitive environment. 58 Financial
crises may still occur during this process, but should be addressed early enough
to be nipped in the bud. That, of course, was the lesson of the 1980s for Taiwan;
it was paying for the cost of a largely successful, but imbalanced, national
development strategy of the 1970s.
Taiwan is not an isolated, island Chinese economy. Recent ties with Hong
Kong and, for that matter, the overseas Chinese business community throughout
Southeast Asia have increased substantially. There is much to the Taiwan-Hong
Kong linkup of their market economies. The two most successful Chinese-
oriented economies offer much hope for an aspiring mainland China. Assuming
a gradually stabilized, enlightened, and liberalized China (or at least regionally
within it), resources in Taiwan are also useful in developing the mainland Chi-
nese market. That, to be sure, will also be the task of the 1990s for these two free
Chinese communities.
59
Taiwan's transformation definitely will center around financial development
strategies, and as argued above, therein lie business opportunities for astute
foreign investors. For its part, Taiwan traditionally has had to rely on human
capital alone, but now has tasted the power of financial capital. In the long run
the capital and financial markets in Taiwan should gain more sophistication and
respect and may indeed play a more significant role in the regional financial
market. Foreign firms will do well to take advantage of the new strategy of
tapping Taiwan's human and financial capital during the next round of its eco-
nomic growth.
58. See Liu, supra note 1, at 358-60.
59. See J. WEISS, THE ASIAN CENTURY 155-56 (1989).
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